



Hugo Lefeuvre (*The University of Manchester*) hugo.lefeuvre@manchester.ac.uk





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Outline:





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hugo.lefeuvre@manchester.ac.uk

Outline:

1. High-Level Presentation of FlexOS





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 $\verb+hugo.lefeuvre@manchester.ac.uk$

Outline:

- 1. High-Level Presentation of FlexOS
- 2. Technical Intro: Hello World!





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- 1. High-Level Presentation of FlexOS
- 2. Technical Intro: Hello World!
- 3. Technical Intro: Redis





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Outline:

- 1. High-Level Presentation of FlexOS
- 2. Technical Intro: Hello World!
- 3. Technical Intro: Redis
- 4. Hands-On: Port Your Lib/App





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Outline:

1. High-Level Presentation of FlexOS

2. Technical Intro: Hello World!

3. Technical Intro: Redis

4. Hands-On: Port Your Lib/App

Technical and hands-on!





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
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
FlexOS: Towards Flexible OS Isolation


Hugo Lefeuvre¹, Vlad-Andrei Bădoiu², Alexander Jung^{3,4}, Stefan Teodorescu², Sebastian Rauch⁵, Felipe Huici^{6,4}, Costin Raiciu^{2,7}, Pierre Olivier¹


¹The University of Manchester, ²Politehnica Bucharest, ³Lancaster University, ⁴Unikraft.io, ⁵Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, ⁶NEC Labs Europe, ⁷Correct Networks















OS security/isolation strategies are **fixed** at design time!


Isolation granularity, underlying mechanisms, data sharing strategies (copy/share)



FlexOS: Flexible Isolation




Decouple security/isolation decisions from the OS design



FlexOS: Flexible Isolation




Decouple security/isolation decisions from the OS design



FlexOS: Flexible Isolation



Decouple security/isolation decisions from the OS design





Deployment to heterogeneous hardware

Make optimal use of each machine/architecture's safety mechanisms with the same code



Deployment to heterogeneous hardware

Make optimal use of each machine/architecture's safety mechanisms with the same code



Quickly isolate vulnerable libraries React easily and quickly to newly published vulnerabilities while waiting for a full patch



Deployment to heterogeneous hardware

Make optimal use of each machine/architecture's safety mechanisms with the same code



Incremental verification of code-bases Mix and match verified and non-verified code-bases while preserving guarantees



Quickly isolate vulnerable libraries React easily and quickly to newly published

vulnerabilities while waiting for a full patch

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

1

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...the more applications run together, the least specialization you can achieve

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

Full-system (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization



1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

Full-system (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization



Not "only application" or "only kernel": consider everything and **specialize**

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

Full-system (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization



Not "only application" or "only kernel": consider everything and **specialize**

Embrace the **library OS philosophy:** everything is a library... network stack, nginx, libopenssl, sound driver, etc.

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

Full-system (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization



3

Abstract away the technical details of isolation mechanisms

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

Full-system (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization



3

Abstract away the technical details of isolation mechanisms

Page table, MPK, CHERI, TEEs? Not the same guarantees, but **a similar interface can be achieved**.

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

Full-system (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization





3

Abstract away the technical details of isolation mechanisms













"Redis image with two compartments, isolate libopenjpeg and lwip together"






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






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FlexOS 101: Overview









Based on a highly modular LibOS design (Unikraft)



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


Such libOSes are composed of *fine-granular*, *independent* libraries

Core	Libra	ries

boot	sched	mm
------	-------	----

Kernel & User Libs




Based on a highly modular LibOS design (Unikraft)

Core Libraries



Such libOSes are composed of *fine-granular*, *independent* libraries




Reuse libraries as finest granularity of compartmentalization

Based on a **highly modular LibOS design** (Unikraft)



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Core Libraries

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
Such libOSes are composed of *fine-granular*, *independent* libraries

Reuse libraries as finest granularity of compartmentalization

"Pre-compartmentalize" them

Cross-library calls and shared data are replaced by an abstract construct (gates, data sharing primitives)


Core Libraries






At build time, these abstract constructs are replaced with a particular implementation by the toolchain. These implementations are defined by the **backends**.








int rc, connfd; char buf[512]; /* ... */ rc = recv(connfd, buf, 512, 0);

```
int rc, connfd;
char buf[512];
/* ... */
rc = recv(connfd, buf, 512, 0);
int rc, connfd;
char buf[512] __attribute__((flexos_share));
/* ... */
rc = flexos_gate(liblwip, recv, connfd, buf, 512, 0);
```













Replace with shared heap allocation













Implementation on top of Unikraft

Backend implementations for Intel MPK and VMs (EPT)

Port of libraries: network stack, scheduler, filesystem, time subsystem

Port of applications: Redis, Nginx, SQLite, iPerf server











Implementation on top of Unikraft

Backend implementations for Intel MPK and VMs (EPT)

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


This talk: focus on demonstrating flexibility and performance



more results in our paper 🙂


Flexibility



Flexibility




Runtime performance with Redis in requests/s



Flexibility



Runtime performance with Redis in requests/s



FlexOS libraries used in the Redis image (only a subset for readability):

- Redis application
- C standard library (newlib)
- FlexOS scheduler (uksched)
- Network stack (lwip)

Flexibility




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Flexibility



Runtime performance with Redis in requests/s



The color of boxes indicates the compartment:

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
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Compartment 1 Compartment 2 Compartment 3

Flexibility



Runtime performance with Redis in requests/s



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Hardening on


Compartment 1


Compartment 2


Hardening off

Compartment 3


The dot whether hardening (ASan, Safestack, etc.) is enabled:










Flexibility



Flexibility







③ Similar performance, very different properties!


need to reason about communication patterns, fast paths




○ Hardening off


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


Performance


















compartments with the page table)









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
1 No overhead when disabling isolation – you only pay for what you get



(2) The MPK backend compares very positively to competing solutions



2 The MPK backend compares very positively to competing solutions Tricky comparison with CubicleOS - they're using linuxu, a Linux userland debug platform of Unikraft



3 The EPT backend too compares positively to competing solutions

Now, we've a nice framework!

We can leverage FlexOS to get the most secure image for a given performance budget!

Now, we've a nice framework!


We can leverage FlexOS to get the most secure image for a given performance budget!

Problem: some configurations are not comparable

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




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


How can we reason about security/performance trade-offs?




What we propose: consider configurations as a partially ordered set (poset)

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


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


What we propose: consider configurations as a partially ordered set (poset)


Two configurations that do not share a path are simply not comparable



We can then label each node with performance characteristics (in practice no need to label everything)




Based on this ordering and labeling we can choose the last node of each path that satisfies the performance constraints




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Let the user do the final choice





Curated list of optimal configurations




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




Curated list of optimal configurations



Applying POSets on Redis



Reduction of 80 configurations to 5 candidates

Nicro/ Micro/ Separation kernels Monolithic kernels Slower Performance Monolithic Faster

There is a **need for isolation flexibility**

In a Nutshell

- OS Specialization, hardware heterogeneity
- or quickly react to vulnerabilities!

Current approaches: one isolation approach at design time

Decouple isolation from the OS design:

- Make isolation decisions at **build time**
- Explore **performance v.s. security trade-offs**

Paper-Related Links





Webpage: https://project-flexos.github.io/ASPLOS'22 paper: https://owl.eu.com/papers/flexos-asplos22.pdf Contact by e-mail: https://www.hugo.lefeuvre@manchester.ac.uk

Artifact Evaluation Repository: <u>https://github.com/project-flexos/asplos22-ae</u> Distinguished Artifact Award!

Practical note: most of the bug reports are reported in the AE repository. Also check known issues and doc in: <u>https://github.com/project-flexos/unikraft</u>

License: 3-Clause BSD License (like Unikraft)





FlexOS: Illustrating the Research Potential of Unikraft

Hugo Lefeuvre (*The University of Manchester*) hugo.lefeuvre@manchester.ac.uk

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Get Your FlexOS Dev Shell



- We set up 48 Docker Containers on an MPK-enabled machine at Manchester
- They contain everything we need for this workshop!

Get Your FlexOS Dev Shell



- We set up 48 Docker Containers on an MPK-enabled machine at Manchester
- They contain everything we need for this workshop!

Credentials will be given during the tutorial!



Disclaimer :-)

- This is a research prototype
- It has been written by a grad student with limited time
- It is not fit for production
- The VM/EPT backend that we are going to use is not the final one (not merged yet unfortunately)



Disclaimer :-)

- This is a research prototype
- It has been written by a grad student with limited time
- It is not fit for production
- The VM/EPT backend that we are going to use is not the final one (not merged yet unfortunately)

But:

• It works (modulo bugs)





Recap of the FlexOS compartmentalization process:

1. Apps/Libs are ported by an expert



- 1. Apps/Libs are ported by an expert
- 2. At build time, users define a compartmentalization conformation



- 1. Apps/Libs are ported by an expert
- 2. At build time, users define a compartmentalization conformation
- 3. The toolchain automatically produces a matching image



- 1. Apps/Libs are ported by an expert
- 2. At build time, users define a compartmentalization conformation
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Application main (slightly simplified)

```
void callback(int foo)
```

í

```
printf("callback called!\n");
```

```
/* static buffer that we pass to the library */
static char static buf[32];
```

```
/* a private static buffer */
static char static_app_secret[32];
```

```
/* shared stack buffer */
char stack_buf[32];
```


```
return 0;
```




Application main (slightly simplified)

<pre>void callback(int foo) </pre>	We have shared callbacks
<pre>{ printf("callback called!\n"); }</pre>	
<pre>/* static buffer that we pass to the library */ static char static_buf[32];</pre>	
<pre>/* a private static buffer */ static char static_app_secret[32];</pre>	
<pre>int main(intunused argc, charunused *argv[]) {</pre>	
<pre>/* shared stack integer */ int stack_int = 21;</pre>	
/* shared stack buffer */ char stack_buf[32];	
<pre>/* call library function */ lib_func(&callback, static_buf,</pre>	
return 0; }	
















Let's run it! (without isolation for now)

```
$ ssh $(your container)
# cd /root/.unikraft/apps/flexos-example
# cp kraft.yaml.fcalls kraft.yaml
# kraft configure
...
```

Why is --initrd needed? <u>https://github.com/project-flexos/asplos22-ae/issues/1</u>



Let's run it! (without isolation for now)

```
$ ssh $(your container)
# cd /root/.unikraft/apps/flexos-example
# cp kraft.yaml.fcalls kraft.yaml
# kraft configure
...
# make prepare && kraft -v build --no-progress --fast --compartmentalize
...
```

Why is --initrd needed? https://github.com/project-flexos/asplos22-ae/issues/1



Let's run it! (without isolation for now)

```
$ ssh $(your container)
# cd /root/.unikraft/apps/flexos-example
# cp kraft.yaml.fcalls kraft.yaml
# kraft configure
...
# make prepare && kraft -v build --no-progress --fast --compartmentalize
...
# kraft run --initrd /root/img.cpio -M 200
SeaBIOS (version 1.12.0-1)
Booting from ROM..[ 0.000000] ERR: [libkvmplat] <mm.c @ 190> ...
callback called!
```

Why is --initrd needed? https://github.com/project-flexos/asplos22-ae/issues/1



Recap of the FlexOS compartmentalization process:

- 1. Apps/Libs are ported by an expert
- 2. At build time, users define a compartmentalization conformation
- 3. The toolchain automatically produces a matching image



Let's run it with isolation?



Let's run it with isolation?



Let's run it with isolation?



Let's run it with isolation?

We need to port it :-)



Application main (slightly simplified)

```
void callback(int foo)
```

ί

```
printf("callback called!\n");
```

```
/* static buffer that we pass to the library */
static char static buf[32];
```

```
/* a private static buffer */
static char static_app_secret[32];
```

```
int main(int __unused argc, char __unused *argv[])
{
```

```
/* shared stack integer */
int stack int = 21;
```

```
/* shared stack buffer */
char stack_buf[32];
```

```
return 0;
```



















Let's run it with isolation! (MPK)

```
$ ssh $(your container)
# cd /root/.unikraft/apps/flexos-example
# kraftcleanup
# git checkout lyon-workshop-ported
# cp kraft.yaml.mpk kraft.yaml
                                                       This branch = lyon-workshop,
# rm .config && kraft configure
                                                       ported like in the previous slide
•••
# make prepare && kraft -v build --no-progress --fast --compartmentalize
•••
# kraft run --initrd /root/img.cpio -M 200
SeaBIOS (version 1.12.0-1)
Booting from ROM.. [ 0.000000] ERR: [libkvmplat] <mm.c @ 190> ...
callback called!
```



Insert gates using our porting helpers:

```
$ ssh $(your container)
```

•••

- # kraftcleanup
- # cd /root/.unikraft
- # ./porthelper.sh apps/flexos-example/main.c



Insert gates using our porting helpers:

```
$ ssh $(your container)
...
# kraftcleanup
# cd /root/.unikraft
# ./porthelper.sh apps/flexos-example/main.c
```

Does a pretty good job, but no rocket science. Does not handle shared data.

The true solution is in the compiler, and that's not a contribution of this paper.

(see PtrSplit @CCS'17, Cali @AsiaCCS'21, etc.)



Let's run it with isolation! (EPT)

```
$ ssh $(your container)
# cd /root/.unikraft/apps/flexos-example
# kraftcleanup
                                                Do not put -- no-progress here, this
# git checkout lyon-workshop-ported
                                                triggers a bug in the toolchain for EPT
# cp kraft.yaml.ept kraft.yaml
                                                https://github.com/project-flexos/asplos22-ae/issues/2
# rm .config && kraft configure
•••
# make prepare && kraft -v build --fast --compartmentalize
•••
# /root/.unikraft/run-ept.sh run build/flexos-example_kvm-x86_64
SeaBIOS (version 1.12.0-1)
Booting from ROM..[ 0.000000] ERR: [libkvmplat] <mm.c @ 190> ...
callback called!
                   Do not use kraft run here; the integration has not been merged yet...
```

https://github.com/project-flexos/asplos22-ae/issues/3



Recap of the FlexOS compartmentalization process:

- 1. Apps/Libs are ported by an expert
- 2. At build time, users define a compartmentalization conformation
- 3. The toolchain automatically produces a matching image

How to inspect the transformations performed by FlexOS?

How to debug FlexOS compartmentalization issues?

How can I peek at FlexOS' internals?



Technical Intro: Transformations

How do the transformations look?

Benefits of source transformations: use git diff and read patch output :-)

\$ ssh \$(your container)
cd /root/.unikraft/apps/flexos-example

flex OS

Technical Intro: Transformations

How do the transformations look?

Benefits of source transformations: use git diff and read patch output :-)

```
$ ssh $(your container)
# cd /root/.unikraft/apps/flexos-example && git diff
diff --git a/main.c b/main.c
index df230c3..5f4ba6d 100644
--- a/main.c
+++ b/main.c
@@ -34,20 +34,26 @@
... <snip>
@@ -58,15 +64,18 @@ int main(int __unused argc, char __unused *argv[])
    static_app_secret[0] = 'B';
    /* shared stack integer used by the library */
    int stack_int __attribute__((flexos_whitelist)) = 21;
    int * stack int = uk malloc(flexos shared alloc, sizeof(int));
    *stack int = 21;
 <snip>
```



Technical Intro: Debugging

How do you debug porting issues?

Technical Intro: Det static_app_secret[0] = 'B';

How do you debug porting issues?

```
# say we forgot some shared data
```

```
/* shared stack integer used by the library */
int stack_int __attribute__((flexos_whitelist)) = 21;
int stack_int = 21;
```

/* shared stack buffer that we pass to the library */ char stack_buf[32] __attribute__((flexos_whitelist));



Technical Intro: Det # say we forgot some shared data static_app_secret[0] = 'B';

How do you debug porting issues?

\$ ssh \$(your container)

```
/* shared stack integer used by the library */
- int stack_int __attribute__((flexos_whitelist)) = 21;
+ int stack_int = 21;
```

... # kraft run ... 0.100770] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <traps.c @ 198> Page fault at linear address 4000dff9c, rip 1962ac, regs 0x1dff50, sp 40011ffd0, our sp 0x1dfee8, code 23 0.106650] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <traps.c @ 198> PF PK: protection key block access (WRITE) 0.110337] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <traps.c @ 198> Target page 0x4000dff9c (section .heap) had key 0 0.114256] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> RIP: 0000000001962ac CS: 0008 0.117436] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> RSP: 00000040011ffd0 SS: 0010 EFLAGS: 00010202 0.121292] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> RAX: 00000000000008100 RBX: 000000040a001cc8 RCX: 000000040a001cc8 0.125842] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> RDX: 00000004000dff9c RSI: 0000000000105320 RDI: 0000000000000054 0.130382] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> RBP: 000000040011ffd0 R08: 000000040a001ca8 R09: 0000000fffffffe 0.134938] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> R10: 000000040a001ce8 R11: 0000000001b5330 R12: 00000004000dff9c 0.139488] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> R13: 000000040a001cc8 R14: 000000005f66fa5 R15: 00000000000000000 0.144041] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <traps.c @ 198> PKU: 00000003ffffff3 0.146893] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> base is 0x40011ffd0 caller is 0x1963f6 0.150432] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> base is 0x40011ffe8 caller is 0



Technical Intro: Det # say we forgot some shared data static_app_secret[0] = 'B';

How do you debug porting issues?


/* shared stack integer used by the library */
int stack_int __attribute__((flexos_whitelist)) = 21;
int stack_int = 21;

\$ ssh \$(your container) # ... # kraft run ... 0.100770] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <traps.c @ 198> Page fault at linear address 4000dff9c, rip 1962ac, regs 0x1dff50, sp 40011ffd0, our_sp 0x1dfee8, code 23 0.106650] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <traps.c @ 198> PF PK: protection key block access (WRITE) 0.110337] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <traps.c @ 198> Target page 0x4000dff9c (section .heap) had key 0 0.114256] CRIT: [libkymplat] <trace.c @ 198> RIP: 0000000001962ac CS: 0008 0.117436] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> RSP: 00000040011ffd0 SS: 0010 EFLAGS: 00010202 0.121292] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> RAX: 00000000000008100 RBX: 000000040a001cc8 RCX: 000000040a001cc8 0.125842] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> RDX: 00000004000dff9c RSI: 0000000000105320 RDI: 0000000000000054 0.130382] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> RBP: 000000040011ffd0 R08: 000000040a001ca8 R09: 0000000fffffffe 0.134938] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> R10: 000000040a001ce8 R11: 0000000001b5330 R12: 00000004000dff9c 0.139488] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> R13: 000000040a001cc8 R14: 000000005f66fa5 R15: 00000000000000000 0.144041] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <traps.c @ 198> PKU: 00000003ffffff3 0.146893] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> base is 0x40011ffd0 caller is 0x1963f6 0.150432] CRIT: [libkvmplat] <trace.c @ 198> base is 0x40011ffe8 caller is 0

Unikraft 0.5 (on which we based FlexOS) did not have symbolized stack traces...

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Technical Intro: Det # say we forgot some shared data static_app_secret[0] = 'B';



\$	ssh \$										
#											
#	kraft										
]	0.1007										
400	11ffd0, d										
] [0.1066										
] [0.1103										
]	0.1142										
]	0.1174										
] [0.12129										
]	0.12584										
] [0.1303										
] [0.1349										
]	0.13948	8] СКІТ	: [ттокумртат]	<trace.c @<="" th=""><th>198></th><th>кіз:</th><th>000000403001CC8 R14:</th><th>ополоновартерия</th><th>KI2: 0000000000000</th><th>101</th><th></th></trace.c>	198>	кіз:	000000403001CC8 R14:	ополоновартерия	KI2: 0000000000000	101	
] [PKU:	00000003ffffff3				
]	0.14689	3] CRI1	: [libkvmplat]	<trace.c@< th=""><th>198></th><th>base</th><th>is 0x40011ffd0 caller</th><th>is 0x1963f6</th><th></th><th></th><th></th></trace.c@<>	198>	base	is 0x40011ffd0 caller	is 0x1963f6			
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Unikraft 0.5 (on which we based FlexOS) did not have symbolized stack traces...

flex

Technical Intro: Det # say we forgot some shared data static_app_secret[0] = 'B'; # addr2line 0x00000000001962ac -e build/flexos-example_kvm-x86_64.dbg /root/.unikraft/libs/flexos-example/isolated.c:42 How do y # cat /root/.unikraft/libs/flexos-example/isolated.c \$ ssh \$. . . # ... 36 void lib_func(void (*callback)(int), char *static_buf, # kraft 37 int *stack_int, char *stack_buf) 0.1007 38 { 40011ffd0, 39 /* use all arguments */ 0.10665 0.11033 40 *static buf = '\0'; 0.11425 0.1174 41 *stack buf = '0'; 0.12129 42 *stack_int = 42; 0.12584 0.13038 43 callback(84); 0.13493 0.13948 44 0.14404 0.14689 0.1504321 CKII. [IIUKVmpiac]

Unikraft 0.5 (on which we based FlexOS) did not have symbolized stack traces...





FlexOS: Illustrating the Research Potential of Unikraft

Hugo Lefeuvre (*The University of Manchester*) hugo.lefeuvre@manchester.ac.uk

Outline:

- 1. High-Level Presentation of FlexOS
- 2. Technical Intro: Hello World!
- 3. Hands-On: Port Your Lib/App

Unikraft Lyon Hackathon, 14th May 2022

Hands-On: Port Your Lib/App



Stuff that we can try porting/running in isolation together:

- Libzlib + a zlib example
 - Library: <u>https://github.com/project-flexos/lib-zlib</u>
 - Application: <u>https://github.com/project-flexos/app-zlib-example</u>

(or whatever you want that runs on Unikraft)

Hands-On: Port Your Lib/App



(or whatever you want that

runs on Unikraft)

Stuff that we can try porting/running in isolation together:

- Libzlib + a zlib example
 - Library: <u>https://github.com/project-flexos/lib-zlib</u>
 - Application: <u>https://github.com/project-flexos/app-zlib-example</u>

```
(iindextrema )
    $ ssh $(your container)
    # cd /root/.unikraft/apps/zlib-example && kraftcleanup
    # kraft configure
    # make prepare && kraft -v build --no-progress --fast --compartmentalize
    # make prepare && kraft -v build --no-progress --fast --compartmentalize
    # kraft run --initrd ./zlib.cpio -M 200
    SeaBIOS (version 1.12.0-1)
    Booting from ROM..[ 0.000000] ERR: [libkvmplat] <mm.c @ 190> ...
    ...
```